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SÍNTESE – O problema do critério é um dos mais
importantes da epistemologia. A resposta que se
dá a ele definirá um aspecto fundamental das
teorias do conhecimento. Neste ensaio, o pro-
blema do critério é apresentado e algumas das
conseqüências geradas pela aceitação de exigên-
cias metaepistemicas são analisadas. Em especi-
al, essas conseqüências são avaliadas em relação
ao infinitismo – a teoria epistemológica segundo a 
qual as razões que sustentam nossas crenças
devem ser infinitas em número e não-repetidas. 
Ao final, sustenta-se que cláusulas que exigem
que a metajustificação seja necessária para o
conhecimento não apenas tornam as teorias
epistemológicas mais plausíveis, mas também
que a ausência de tais exigências acaba criando
problemas muito difíceis, como o assim chamado
“problema do conhecimento fácil”. 
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ABSTRACT – This essay discusses the Problem 
of the Criterion, one of the most important 
problems in Epistemology. The answer given to 
this problem will shape a fundamental aspect 
of theories of knowledge. It also analyzes some 
of the consequences epistemological theories 
may face in accepting metaepistemological 
requirements. These consequences are given 
special consideration with regard to Infinitism,
the epistemological theory according to which 
the reasons that support our beliefs must be 
infinite and non-repeating. Finally, this essay 
claims not only that those propositions that 
require metajustification make any theory, even 
Infinitism, more plausible, but also that the 
absence of such requirements creates difficult 
problems, such as the so-called “Problem of Easy 
Knowledge.” 
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The Problem of the Criterion (PC) leaves us grappling with a very complicated 
question: should we think that knowing that one knows is a condition of knowing 
in the first place? This question can be posed in different ways: must a theory 
state that to know that an evidence or reason is adequate is part of what is neces-
sary to be justified in believing some proposition on the basis of that evidence or 
reason? Or, still, is it right to claim that we can come to know some proposition p 
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on the basis of having arrived at p through a reliable process of belief formation 
without knowing that the process is in fact reliable?
1 
As Chisholm described it once, the PC consists of having to make a special 
kind of decision, “how do we decide, in any particular case, whether we have a 
genuine item of knowledge?”
2 Of course, those are epistemic decisions, since 
they are about deciding whether we know that we know something. As a result, 
the PC must be defined as a metaepistemological problem. With that in mind, 
for present purposes, it will prove useful to call the PC a “metaepistemological 
problem” (departing somewhat from the conventional use of the adjective 
“metaepistemological”). 
There are two obvious ways in which we can deal with the PC. On the one 
hand, we might say that the PC is only about second-order knowledge.
3 In this 
sense, granting that we have first-order knowledge, we should only try to find 
out if we know that we have this piece of first-order knowledge. An eventual 
failure to know that we know would have no impact on our first-order knowl-
edge. In this case, the situation in which S knows that some proposition p is 
true, but fails to know that he knows p is true, would be unproblematic. 
On the other hand, we might say that the claim underlying the PC states 
that in order to have first-order knowledge we must know that we know. Then, 
in order to know that some proposition p is true, we will have to know that the 
reason on which our believing that p is based is adequate, or that the process of 
belief formation of p is reliable. Otherwise, we would be missing some funda-
mental point regarding the phenomenon of knowledge. To use an expression 
from Sextus Empiricus, lacking this second-order knowledge will make us so 
vulnerable to criticism that we would be discredited. 
In one sense, then, we could claim that, since the PC has this metaepiste-
mological nature, the question is not about whether we know something – i.e. it 
is not about first-order knowledge – but only about whether we know that we 
know something – i.e. it is only about second-order or metaknowledge. Yet, 
under another interpretation, we could say that the metaepistemological nature 
of the PC makes it a problem about whether we know something, because fail-
ing to know that we know would have a negative impact on our first-order 
knowledge. In this last sense, the PC would point to the existence of a natural 
and resilient bridge between knowing and knowing that one knows. 
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2
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3
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According to the theories that deny that we have to know that we know in 
order to know in the first place, the phenomenon of knowledge can be understood 
and completely captured in the absence of second-order knowledge. Thus, a per-
son S should be granted knowledge that p if, for example, he believes a true 
proposition p and uses a reliable process of belief formation, without having to 
know that the process is in fact reliable. But, according to the other way to deal 
with the PC, if S has a true belief that p, and this belief is a result from what is, 
unbeknownst to S, a reliable process of belief formation, S could be seen, from 
some point of view (naturally, not the point of view of S himself), as avoiding an 
accidentally true belief. But if S did not know that the process was reliable, S 
would be missing something epistemically decisive. In the absence of second-
order knowledge, what S has doesn’t amount to much at all. 
Following Stewart Cohen’s suggestion, we may call the theories that claim 
that we can come to know that p is true without knowing that we know p, “Basic 
knowledge structure theories” (BKT). Also, we may call the first-order knowledge 
acquired without metaknowledge “Basic knowledge” (BK). According to Cohen, 
S has basic knowledge of P just in case S knows P prior to knowing that the cognitive 
source of S’s knowing P is reliable. Our knowledge has basic knowledge structure just 
in case we have basic knowledge and we come to know our faculties are reliable on 
the basis of our basic knowledge.
4 
The BKT permit, then, that a knowledge source “can deliver knowledge prior 
to one’s knowing that the source is reliable”
5 and “hold that reliability knowledge 
is based on basic knowledge”.
6 
Before proceeding, I want to clarify a couple of things about the vocabulary 
Cohen uses. First, the idea of “knowledge source” can be seen as indicating two 
things: a knowledge source could be a method of belief formation, as well as the 
reason that is supposed to justify some particular belief. I think this is what Cohen 
means. Moreover, we must bear in mind that “reliability knowledge” is equivalent 
to metaknowledge, in the sense that, when one gets knowledge of the reliability of 
a knowledge source, one knows that one knows. 
In light of these last clarifications, the point is this: if the BKT hold that 
metaknowledge can be based on basic knowledge there would be a decisive rea-
son to abandon those theories. The threat faced by BKT is what has been called 
“bootstrapping”.
7 I will not discuss this problem in great detail, but I do want to 
clarify what “bootstrapping” means. 
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   Cohen, Stewart (2002, p. 311) 
7
   According to Cohen, the BKT will face what he called the “Problem of Easy Knowledge”, and 
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We can think of bootstrapping through the following example.
8 Suppose that a 
person, Michael, is driving his car from California to Alaska. Soon after he passes a 
gas station, he reads a road sign that says that the next gas station will be 300 
miles away. Then, he looks at the car’s gas gauge and comes to believe (1) the 
tank is full. According to a BKT like Reliabilism, this belief is an item of knowledge 
for Michael, provided that (a) it is true that the tank is full and (b) the gauge is 
reliable – both of which we can suppose for the sake of the argument. Using the 
terms just defined, Michael has BK that (1). So, according to Reliabilism, even if 
Michael does not know that he knows the tank is full or that the gas gauge is 
reliable, his belief that the tank is full is an item of knowledge for him. 
A bit later, seeing that it is getting dark and cold out there, Michael checks 
the gas gauge again. Now, he comes to believe (2) the gauge marks “full.”  
According to a BKT, (2) is also an item of Michael’s knowledge, provided that it is 
true that the gauge marks “full” and that Michael’s vision is reliable – which we 
can also suppose for the sake of the argument. Again, Michael doesn’t know that 
he knows (2), but he knows the gauge marks “full.” Once again, Michael has BK 
that (2). 
At this moment, Michael can believe (3) the gauge marks “full” and the tank 
is full. From any point of view, Michael is entitled to infer (3) from (1) and (2).  
Actually, since Michael comes to believe (3) deducting it from (1) and (2), Michael 
knows (3), given that deduction is a reliable process of belief formation. I will insist 
on one point, since it seems very important: Michael doesn’t know that he in fact 
knows (1) or (2), but according to the BKT, unbeknownst to him, he knows (1) and 
(2), and once he deduces (3) from (1) and (2), he knows (3) as well. 
Here is where the Bootstrapping comes in: since Michael knows (3), nothing 
prevents him from inferring from (3), (4) the gauge is working properly on this 
occasion. Since the example I am offering is quite similar to Vogel’s example, and 
given how crucial this step is, it seems useful to see exactly what he says. 
So, for example, when the gauge reads ‘F’ she believes that, on this occasion, the tank 
is full. She also believes that, on this occasion, the gauge reads ‘F’. Moreover, Roxanne 
combines these beliefs; she believes: (20) On this occasion, the gauge reads ‘F’ and F. 
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Closure Principle. 
8
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Certainly, the perceptual process by which Roxanne forms her belief that the gauge 
reads ‘F’ is a reliable one. By hypothesis, her belief that the tank is full is also reached 
by a reliable process. Hence, there seems to be no good reason to deny that Roxanne’s 
belief in (20) is the result of a reliable process, and the reliabilist will say that she 
knows (20). Now, it is a completely straightforward logical consequence of (20) that: 
(21) On this occasion, the gauge is reading accurately. Assume that Roxanne deduces 
(21) from (22). Deduction is certainly a reliable process, so there is no loss of reliability 
at this step. Consequently, it seems that Roxanne must be credited with knowing 
(21).
9 
Going back to our example, the decisive step is when Michael comes to know 
the gauge is reading accurately on some occasion based on his knowledge of (3) 
(the gauge marks “full” and the tank is full). Furthermore, if Michael repeats this 
same procedure and makes a few inductive inferences, he can then come to know 
that the gauge is working properly.
10 As we have seen, (3) is based on Michael’s 
basic knowledge of (1) and (2). So – without forgetting the inductive step – we can 
claim that reliability knowledge is being based on basic knowledge. 
Now, what would be the problem if Michael comes to believe (4) the gauge 
is working properly on some particular occasion? In a certain sense, there is no 
problem at all, as long as Michael infers (4) from (3). However, the point is that 
with (4) Michael suddenly comes to know that he knows the tank is full, since 
(a) knowing that the gauge is working properly is equivalent to reliability   
knowledge
11 and (b) reliability knowledge is equivalent to knowing that one 
knows. The problem for BKT, then, is that the description of Michael’s acquisi-
tion of second-order knowledge is in perfect accord with a BKT like Reliabilism, 
but this acquisition of second-order knowledge cannot be considered legitimate. 
So, this way of acquiring metaknowledge may be seen as a reductio of all BKT’s. 
In our example, Michael is basing reliability knowledge on basic knowledge. 
Since it is not only Reliabilism that holds that reliability knowledge is based on 
basic knowledge, the problem must be in the feature of all BKT’s that is shared 
by Reliabilism. The problem is that we cannot come to know that we know in 
this way, but this way of acquiring metaknowledge is approved by any BKT. So, 
we have a problem with BKT in general. 
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We must note also that, as was pointed out by Cohen,
12 not only Externalist 
theories, like Reliabilism, are BKT, and thus face the Problem of Bootstrapping. On 
the contrary, as we will see, many Internalist theories, like Infinitism, can be 
BKT’s as well. 
In what follows, I shall assume that BKT’s cannot provide a comprehensive 
analysis of knowledge or justification, since all BKT face the Bootstrapping Prob-
lem. In turn, the most important point is that the Bootstrapping Problem derives 
from a misdirected description of the condition for first-order knowledge or justifi-
cation. Hence, we cannot separate epistemic levels, and we have to analyze the 
phenomenon of knowledge in a way that combines knowing and knowing that 
one knows. 
Infinitism 
Infinitism is preferable to both Coherentism and Foundationalism, mainly in 
light of the fact that Infinitism is the only theory capable of avoiding dogmatism as 
well as circularity. I am not going to defend Infinitism over Foundationalism and 
Coherentism, though. I agree with Klein that no criticism against Infinitism does 
succeed.
13 
However, I want to take into account a particular feature of Klein’s Infinitism 
and try to suggest that it must (and can) be changed in order for Infinitism to be 
transformed into a more compelling theory. The aspect of Infinitism I will treat is 
directly related to that which is responsible for making some theory a BKT. 
According to Klein, a person S will have justification to believe some proposi-
tion p if S has reasons available to him. This is what the Principle of Avoiding 
Arbitrariness states, 
(PAA) For all x, if a person, S, has a justification for x, then there is some reason, r1, 
available to S for x, and there is some reason, r2, available to S for r1, etc, and there is 
no last reason in the series.
14 
The notion of availability has two different aspects, one subjective and an-
other objective. In spite of the relevance that subjective availability has for Infini-
tism, we can put this notion aside. What is crucial for our purposes here is the 
idea according to which a reason must be objectively available for S. 
The conception that a reason must be objectively available to some person S 
shows that not just any proposition will be a reason for S to believe some other 
proposition. It means that the reason r must be adequate from some objective 
perspective. Furthermore, by granting that not any proposition can be a proper 
justifier, Infinitism need not produce a particular account of objective availability. 
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As Klein says, “there are many accounts of objective availability. Each specifies 
either some normative or non-normative properties or, perhaps, a mixed property 
that is sufficient to convert a belief into a reason”.
15 We could think of these ac-
counts of objective availability in this way, 
One could say that a belief, r, is objectively available to S as a reason for p if (1) r has 
some sufficiently high probability and the conditional probability of p given r is suffi-
ciently high; or (2) an impartial, informed observer would accept r as a reason for p; or 
(3) r would be accepted in the long run by an appropriately defined set of people; or (4) 
r is evident for S and r makes p evident for S; or (5) r accords with S’s deepest epis-
temic commitments; or (6) r meets the appropriate conversational presuppositions; or 
(7) an intellectually virtuous person would advance r as a reason for p.
16 
By itself, this aspect doesn’t subject Infinitism to the Bootstrapping Problem. 
As we know, the requirement of objective availability is quite common in almost 
all theories of knowledge or justification. The aspect I want to point out is the idea 
according to which S is not supposed to be justified that r is objectively available 
to him in order for S to have justification to believe p on the basis of r. Actually, for 
Klein, S need not have either (a) a belief that r is an objectively available reason for 
believing p, or (b) have justification – without believing – that r is objectively avail-
able to S. According to Klein, all that matters is the objective property that r must 
have in order for S to have justification to believe p on the basis of r. 
In a footnote to “Human knowledge and infinite regress of reasons,” Klein 
says, 
Let me make the distinction between the three views of justification absolutely clear. 
The ‘thin’ view (the one I think is correct) holds that S has a justification for p on the 
basis of r entails that (a) S believes r and (b) r is reason for p. It does not require that, 
in addition, either (1) S believes that r is a reason for p or (2) S is justified in believing 
that r is a reason for p. The ‘moderately thick view’ (the one I think is plausible) adds 
(1) to the thin view. The ‘extremely thick view’ (the one I think cannot be correct) adds 
(2) and presumably (1) as well to the thin view.
17 
Klein still adds, “I think it is the reason available to S for p that determines 
whether S has a justification for p regardless of S’s beliefs about those reasons.”
18 
This characteristic of Infinitism, or of any kind of Internalism, is what makes it a 
BKT. 
It is quite important to make some distinctions here. First of all, no plausible 
theory would deny the possibility of acquiring second-order knowledge, or deny 
the possibility for some person S to have justification that he has justification to 
believe some proposition p. The point is whether we will consider the metaepis-
temic requirement a necessary condition to be justified in the first place. Second, 
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there is a difference between (a) requiring a belief according to which a reason r is 
a good or adequate reason to believe p, and (b) requiring justification to believe 
that a reason r is a good or adequate reason to believe p. 
At the outset, it seems that what subjects a theory to the Bootstrapping Prob-
lem is not related to believing itself. What matters is justification only. Hence, 
Infinitism couldn’t be made invulnerable to the Bootstrapping Problem if it re-
quired that S must believe, or must have some disposition to believe, that r is the 
reason for believing p. Therefore, even Klein’s “moderately thick view” wouldn’t 
keep Infinitism from being a BKT. What may prevent a theory from being a BKT is 
the need to name the epistemic efficiency of what justifies some belief. 
We could say, then, that the BKT could be avoided either with (a) the re-
quirement that S needs to have justification for believing that r is objectively avail-
able to S, or (b) the requirement that S needs a justified belief that r is objectively 
available to him. I think (a) is more adequate, because it seems enough to keep a 
theory from being a BKT, although not as demanding as (b), since (a) doesn’t re-
quire an act of believing. 
Demanding the identification of the reason that is being used in believing p 
does not prevent the Bootstrapping Problem, because the mere identification of 
the reason is not enough to avoid a question that resides precisely in our capac-
ity to identify the epistemic efficacy of our reasons. Undoubtedly, identifying the 
reason used – which also goes for the method of belief formation – is a neces-
sary condition, since we couldn’t have justification, or a justified belief, that the 
reason r is objectively available if we are not aware of which reason, or method, 
is being used to support some particular belief p. What is required to avoid the 
Bootstrapping Problem is some justification for a belief about the epistemic ef-
fectiveness of the reasons we use to hold some particular belief p. Therefore, in 
order to avoid Bootstrapping, we would have to uphold the two first conditions 
offered by Klein, namely, (1) S believes r and (2) r is a [objectively available] 
reason for p, but add that S must have justification to believe that the reason r is 
objectively available to him – provided this last condition implies that S is capa-
ble of identifying the reasons he actually uses for believing p. 
If the absence of a requirement according to which S would need to have 
justification to believe that the reason r is objectively available to him in order to 
have justification to believe p on the basis of r correctly depicts Klein’s proposal, 
then Infinitism should be characterized as a BKT. Any BKT will deny that we 
have to have justification that our reason to believe p really does justify p in 
order to have justification to believe p on the basis of that reason in the first 
place. Infinitism, having the basic knowledge structure, allows that a reason r, 
being objectively available, grants justification to S before S knows that r is ob-
jectively available to him. Then, S could know p without knowing that he knows 
p. (Granted, S could come to know that he knows p if S knows that r is an ap-
propriate reason to believe p).   117
Infinitism allows for basic knowledge in the same way Reliabilism does. As 
we can see, in this respect Infinitism is identical to Reliabilism. In fact, the only 
difference between them is that, with regard to Infinitism, we will talk about the 
objective availability of some reason, and with regard to Reliabilism, we will talk 
about the reliability of some belief formation process instead. Nonetheless, this 
difference is just not of consequence. What is central to both these theories is the 
absence of epistemic priority of second-order knowledge over first-order knowl-
edge. Consequently, Reliabilism as well as Infinitism allow for BK and then permit 
the acquisition of metaknowledge on the basis of BK. 
Basing knowledge of the reliability of a process on a belief that results from 
that same process must be equivalent to using a belief p which is objectively 
justified by reason r to show that r is an objectively available reason to believe p. 
In both cases, what we have is the same: basic knowledge illegitimately generat-
ing metaknowledge. Again, what makes this possible is that it is not necessary for 
S to have some justification to believe that r is an objectively available reason to 
believe p in order to have justification to believe p on the basis of r in the first 
place. Whenever we are dealing with the reliability of a belief formation process, 
we could bootstrap in order to come to know that the process is reliable; when-
ever we talk about reasons, we could bootstrap in order to come to know that we 
have objectively available reasons for our beliefs. In both cases, the problem re-
sides in the inadequacy of the constraints that are placed upon what is a neces-
sary condition for having justification for believing some proposition in the first 
place. In both cases, concerning reliability and objective availability, S will be able 
to use his BK in order to show that the reason he uses to justify his beliefs is in 
fact appropriate, exactly because it is not required of S that he have independent 
justification to believe that his reason is adequate. In other words, the problem is 
that just using a reliable method, or just having an objectively available reason, is 
not enough to have justification for believing in the first place. 
Suppose, for example, that a person, Pedro, believes (1) a snowstorm is likely 
in Montana, and that the reason Pedro has to believe (1) is that (2) dark clouds are 
gathering over the mountains and it is mid-winter in Montana.
19 Let us suppose 
that (2) is objectively available for Pedro, but that he doesn’t know that (2) is ade-
quate to justify his belief in (1). Accordingly, Pedro may know that a snowstorm is 
likely, provided that (a) (1) is true; (b) he uses (2) to base his belief in (1) and (c) (2) 
is an objective available reason for believing (1). However, since he doesn’t know 
(c), he doesn’t know that he knows (1). So, if Pedro believes (1), this belief will be, 
unbeknownst to him, an item of knowledge – a BK – for him. 
If the description above is compatible with Infinitism, Infinitism cannot pre-
vent Pedro from using his BK to come to know that he knows that a snowstorm is 
likely. This situation is analogous to the gas gauge example: if Pedro believes (1), 
and his belief in (1) is supported by (2), then Pedro knows (1). If Pedro doesn’t 
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know that (2) is adequate to justify (1), Pedro has BK of (1). Yet Pedro must be 
capable of identifying that (2) is being used to justify (1).
20 So, once he knows (1) 
and realizes that (1) is based on (2), Pedro can believe (3) a snowstorm is likely and 
dark clouds are gathering over the mountains and it is mid-winter in Montana. 
Now, nothing prevents Pedro from, on the basis of (3), coming to believe (4) 
that dark clouds are gathering over the mountains and it is mid-winter in Montana 
is an appropriate reason to believe that a snowstorm is likely. This is possible 
because Pedro, according to Infinitism, knows (1), and, by introspection, knows 
that (1) is based on (2). 
As was the case with the gas gauge example, I think it would be useful to see 
what exactly Cohen writes about it, 
In fact, the problem of bootstrapping generalizes to evidentialist theory as well. That 
is, it generalizes to any evidentialist theory that allows for basic knowledge. […] Con-
sider evidentialist foundationalism: according to that view, I can know the table is red 
on the basis of its looking red, even though I have no prior evidence that something’s 
looking red is a reliable indication that it is red. But once I know the table is red, I can 
appeal to that fact in reasoning. A little introspection will tell me that the table appears 
red. So now I know that the table looks red and that it is red. So now I have some evi-
dence that something’s looking red is a reliable indication that it is red. And by taking 
a few more looks, I can acquire more evidence.
21 
It is important to be clear about this: a BKT, as Infinitism, must concede 
that Pedro knows two things: (A) his belief that a snowstorm is likely is based 
on his belief that dark clouds are gathering over the mountains and it is mid-
winter in Montana, and (B) a snowstorm is likely. In other words, he knows that 
a snowstorm is likely and knows why he believes so, even though he doesn’t 
know that he knows that a snowstorm is likely, i.e. even though he doesn’t 
know that (2) is appropriate to justify (1). In this circumstance, since Pedro 
knows (A) and (B), nothing can prevent him from believing that (4) dark clouds 
are gathering over the mountains and it is mid-winter in Montana is an appro-
priate reason to believe that a snowstorm is likely. Now, (4) is equivalent to 
knowing that one knows that a snowstorm is likely, given that knowing that the 
reason to believe (1) is appropriate is equivalent to knowing that one knows (1). 
In this case, Pedro suddenly knows that he knows that a snowstorm is 
likely, since he now knows that his reason, namely (2), is adequate to justify his 
believing (1). This means that the absence of a requirement according to which 
Pedro needs to have a reason to believe that (2) is adequate for believing (1) in 
order to have justification for believing (1) in the first place makes it possible for 
Pedro to know that he knows (1) in a way that cannot be legitimate. 
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What is crucial here is that given that Pedro may identify (2) as the reason to 
believe (1), even without any independent reason to believe that (2) is appropriate to 
justify (1), if Pedro introspects a little he may find an illegitimate way to believe that 
(2) is appropriate to justify (1), and then, appears as if knowing that he knows (1). 
What happens to Infinitism is the same that happens to Reliabilism: there is 
no sufficient constraint about what is necessary to have justification to believe in 
the first place. This way to get second-order knowledge or justification is illegiti-
mate only because the way to get first-order knowledge, even though it may not 
seem wrong from some perspective, cannot be right. The problem with this sec-
ond-order knowledge acquisition derives from too lax a set of conditions for first-
order knowledge. 
I am quite sure that there are various ways to manifest dissatisfaction with 
the restrictions that concern a requirement of metajustification. Take, for instance, 
Lehrer’s appraisal, 
Examples of alleged knowledge in which a person does not know that the information 
he accepts is correct may be of some philosophical interest but such knowledge falls 
outside the concern of knowledge used in a way that is characteristically human in 
critical reasoning and the life of reason.
22 
In some sense, the Bootstrapping Problem can be seen as demonstrative of 
what is wrong with the sense of “knowledge” that results when one ignores 
whether the information accepted is correct – or ignores that a reason is objec-
tively available, or that a process is reliable. Therefore, the Bootstrapping Problem 
just helps to establish a very welcome result for epistemology: no theory of knowl-
edge can claim that a person S knows p without knowing that he knows p. 
Avoiding The Bootstrapping Problem 
If the previous diagnosis is right, it is not too difficult to see what kind of 
change must be made in order to eliminate the threat of the Bootstrapping Prob-
lem. The idea consists of reestablishing the epistemic priority of second-order 
knowledge. If the root of the Bootstrapping Problem grows from an unbalanced 
relation between first and second-order knowledge, all we have to do is bring 
proper equilibrium to this relationship. The point, then, is just to realize that we 
cannot separate knowing from knowing that one knows, and find a way to keep 
them adequately related. However, to accept that we cannot separate epistemic 
levels will be much simpler than to explain how exactly we must relate them. 
Focusing only on what matters most to our present concerns, it must be 
made clear that to keep the levels adequately related means that we will have to 
claim that in order to have justification to believe some proposition p on the basis 
of some reason r, one has to have justification to believe that r is a proper justifier 
for p. This means that we will have to have metajustification for believing p. Or, in 
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other words, if we have justification to believe some proposition p, because p 
results from a reliable method of belief formation m, then it must be the case that 
we have justification to believe that method m is reliable. This sort of metajustifi-
cation requirement will make any theory immune to the Bootstrapping Problem. 
Before proceeding, let us further clarify the idea of “metajustification” or 
“metaepistemic requirement.” As it will be understood here, a metajustification 
must be directed toward some particular belief. Thus, in the same way we can ask 
for justification for the belief that p, we can ask for metajustification for the belief 
that p. Justification for believing p involves the reasons we have to believe that 
some proposition is true; metajustification concerns our reason to believe that the 
reason we have for believing that p adequately justifies our belief that p. Let us 
use an example to clarify how the metajustification requirement may work. Sup-
pose that I believe that people from Angola speak Portuguese, and suppose that 
my justification to believe that it is true that people in Angola speak Portuguese 
consists of the following reason: Angola was colonized by Portugal. The metajusti-
fication to believe that people from Angola speak Portuguese will consist of my 
justification to believe that my reason, namely that Angola was colonized by Por-
tugal, really justifies my belief that people from Angola speak Portuguese. It could 
be something like “colonies inherit the language of their colonizers.” My metajus-
tification to believe that people from Angola speak Portuguese consists of my 
justification to believe that my reason, that Angola was colonized by Portugal, is 
effective in justifying my belief that in Angola people speak Portuguese, and the 
proposition “colonies inherit the language of their colonizers” plays this role. 
As you may have noticed, there is a potential problem lurking around here.  
I will come back to it later. 
In principle, there are many different ways to describe what it is that could 
make any theory bulletproof against Bootstrapping. My own suggestion is that, in 
conjunction with the objective conditions for justification proposed by Klein, we 
will have to add something along the lines of the second clause of Fumerton’s 
Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ): to be justified in believing one proposi-
tion P, on the basis of another proposition E, one must be (1) justified in believing 
E and (2) justified in believing that E makes probable P.
23 
Discussing the PIJ will lead us to consider two important points that are in-
volved in the metajustification requirement and, as long as we make the necessary 
clarifications, we can deal with those two points. 
One important clarification has to do with the very terms in which Fumerton 
expresses the second clause of the PIJ. I don’t think it is necessary – for our pur-
poses here, at least – to understand the second clause of the principle including the 
specific content Fumerton holds is the right one to make r a justifier for p, namely 
the idea according to which r makes probable p. We can just leave open the possi-
bility that that which makes r a justifier for p need not be defined as a probabilistic 
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relation between r and p, and substitute “r makes probable p” for “r justifies p.”  
I don’t think it would be wrong, in a preliminary analysis, to interpret the second 
clause of the PIJ as, “in order to have justification for believing p on the basis of r, or 
method m, one must have justification to believe that r justifies p, or that the 
method m is reliable.” 
Furthermore, we should read the PIJ as stating that one has to have justification 
for believing, but not necessarily a justified belief, that the reasons are adequate or 
the processes are reliable. Since having justification is enough to avoid the 
Bootstrapping Problem, we don’t need a justified belief to make any theory 
invulnerable to the problem. 
We can now deal with the following points. The first point has to do with the 
idea that accepting a principle like the PIJ, or any other principle that states the 
necessity of a metaepistemic requirement, implies being committed to some form of 
“level confusion”.
24 
I am not quite sure about the best way of characterizing a level confusion. If to 
state some relation between the levels, particularly the relation according to which 
we cannot be justified in the first place without having justification for the belief that 
we have justification, implies confusing epistemic levels, then the second clause of 
the PIJ – and, in fact, any metaepistemic requirement – confuses epistemic levels. 
However, one could hardly say that any such thing is, per se, a case of level 
confusion. Actually, talking about justification without making some necessary 
distinctions is exactly what seems to be at the core of level confusion. A case of 
level confusion would be the result of the absence of a clear distinction between 
having justification to believe p and having metajustification to believe p. The 
failure to keep this distinction clear seems to me a more correct way to 
characterize level confusion. 
The pivotal problem with the acceptance of the second clause of the PIJ, 
though, is that it would generate an infinite metaregress: “[I]f finite minds should 
worry about the possibility of completing one infinitely long chain of reasoning, 
they should be downright depressed about the possibility of completing an infinite 
number of infinitely long chains of reasons”.
25 The point, then, is that the idea of 
completing an infinite number of infinitely long chains of reasoning cannot be 
claimed as a necessary condition to be justified in believing any proposition, since 
it is just impossible to complete any such infinite chain. 
The criticism against Infinitism seems to take, then, two forms: one concerns 
the first-order regress, and refers to the necessity of completing one infinite chain 
of reasoning, to which I will refer here as one infinity. The other concerns the 
second-order regress, or metaregress, and refers to completing not just one, but 
an infinite number of infinite chains of reasoning, to which I will refer here as 
infinite infinities. 
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Now it is necessary to identify what exactly is the problem that could afflict 
Infinitism. Although it may be a platitude to say that not every infinite series or 
regress is a vicious one, it seems appropriate to insist on it. Just to remember a 
single example, 
A well-known example of a ‘benign’ regress is the so-called ‘truth regress.’ This re-
gress, which can be derived simply from the Tarsky schema and plausible ancillary as-
sumptions about what are fit substitutions into the schema, demonstrates that there 
are an infinite number of truths corresponding to each truth. For, as is commonly 
known, where p is some proposition, if p is true, then ‘p is true’ is true, as is ‘‘p is 
true’ is true’ is true, and so on.
26 
So, I cannot agree with the claim that an infinite regress or series is vicious 
only because of the fact that it is infinite. There must be something more than the 
mere property of being infinite that makes a particular series, chain, or regress a 
vicious one. Hence, the mere existence of some infinite series or regress cannot 
counts as a reductio of Infinitism. On the contrary, I will assume that, in order to 
constitute a refutation, it must be shown why some particular infinite series, 
chain, or regress is vicious. 
However, the idea of completing an infinite chain of reasoning does point to 
what will make Infinitism an implausible theory. Accordingly, Infinitism would seem 
to imply that a person would have to have infinite beliefs in order to have a single 
justified belief. More precisely, one would have to have infinite beliefs in order to 
have a single justified belief. In this idea, apparently, would reside Infinitism’s most 
serious problem. 
Now, as far as I can see, this supposed problem is not necessarily related to the 
metaregress. The impossibility of completing an infinite number of infinite chains of 
reasoning is the very same problem we would find if we considered only the first-
order regress, i.e. considering only the impossibility of completing one infinite chain 
of reasoning. To be clear, if the criticism against Infinitism is grounded on the idea 
that no human being is capable of completing one infinite chain of reasoning, then it 
is just unnecessary to add infinite infinities to the criticism, since just one infinity is 
enough to make the point. In fact, there cannot exist any difference between the 
impossibility of completion of one infinity and infinite infinities. Nothing can become 
more impossible to complete than one infinity, and talking about infinite infinities 
will just repeat the same point. So, the difference between first and second-order 
regress is irrelevant to this criticism, since it does not depend in any way on the 
metaregress, i.e. it does not depend on infinite infinities. Therefore, I do not agree 
that there is a difference regarding problems posed by one infinity – the first-order 
regress – that according to Fumerton may makes us “worried,” and problems posed 
by infinite infinities – the metaregress – that would make us not only worried, but 
“downright depressed.” Actually, both present the same problem and, as far as I can 
see, if we were supposed to complete one infinite chain of reasoning, we should be 
downright depressed from the very beginning. 
                             
26
   Nolan, Daniel, “What’s Wrong With Infinite Regresses?”, Metaphilosophy, 2001, p. 524.   123
If this is right, there should be no problem on the second-level, as long as 
there is no problem on the first-level. So, if Infinitism correctly deals with the first-
order regress, as I think it does, we have got a reason at least to suspect that 
Infinitism may provide a correct way to handle this metaregress and, in fact, all 
kinds of regresses. 
I will not focus on the infinitist response to the criticism according to which 
Infinitism implies that we would have to complete an infinite chain of reasoning. 
Klein has already shown that line of criticism misrepresents properly formulated 
infinitist claim.
27 For present purposes, suffice it to say that, while it is true that no 
one would be able to complete an infinite chain of reasoning, Infinitism does not 
claim that this would have to be done. In fact, according to Infinitism, it is not 
necessary to complete an infinite chain of reasoning in order to have a justified 
belief. 
I just would like to explain a little further why the idea that there must exist 
an infinite number of reasons available for S, if S has justification to believe some 
proposition p, does not imply that S will be committed to providing reasons non-
stop all the time. 
Klein has claimed that sometimes we are just not involved with the process of 
justification, and because of this, we are not supposed to provide reasons all the 
time. He must be right about this, although I think the explanation of why we can 
stop providing reasons and still be considered non-dogmatics is not yet fully devel-
oped.
28 Of course, getting tired, needing to sleep or even dieing, could explain why 
we sometimes stop providing reasons for our beliefs.
29 However, claiming this would 
not explain why we stop providing reasons in a rational or non-dogmatic fashion. So, 
this sort of suggestion is sufficient to show why we sometimes stop providing rea-
sons, but it is not enough to explain why we can do so in a non-dogmatic way. 
I think the best way to give the required explanation is by focusing on the 
fact that we can stop providing reasons in a non-dogmatic fashion once we elimi-
nate whatever it is that creates a need to provide reasons in the first place. This 
means that the need to provide reasons – or to create reasons, if it were the case – 
must respect some criterion. As far as I can see, this criterion seems to be that of 
doubt, which in turn is generated by disagreements, dialectical or in soliloquy. I 
will not try to offer here a complete explanation of this point, but it is imperative 
to understand the stopping places of Infinitism in these terms: disagreements 
create doubts, and doubts generate the need to provide or create reasons. Without 
disagreement, that is, without doubt, there is no need to provide reasons, but this 
has nothing to do with the requirement according to which if S has justification to 
believe some proposition p, then there must be an infinite number of reasons 
available to him. This means that, when doubt is eliminated, we can rationally 
stop providing reasons. On the other hand, if we still have doubts about some-
                             
27
   Klein, Peter, 2003. 
28
   I think Klein himself would agree with that. 
29
   Klein, Peter, “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning”. Forthcoming.   124
thing, we can stop providing reasons at will, but in no way would this manner of 
stopping avoid dogmatism. It is not rational to stop providing reasons when I am 
fatigued if a disagreement is taking place, because that which generates the need 
to provide reasons still persists. On the other hand, I can find a rational stopping 
place for providing reasons if I no longer find disagreements. Of course, this kind 
of stopping place is provisional, since the absence of disagreement today does not 
guarantee an agreement tomorrow. In other words, I have no assurances that a 
belief that is bedrock to me at present will be a bedrock belief to me in the future. 
However, this provisional stopping place does not seem either problematic or 
mysterious, but quite natural indeed. So, we should say that, according to Infini-
tism, justification is not provisional, but the rational stopping places are. 
In any case, the important point is that the same kind of response that will be 
given to the problem of the impossibility of completing an infinite chain of reason-
ing when it arises in the first-order regress can be given with respect to the sec-
ond-order regress, namely, that we are not supposed either to complete an infinite 
chain of reasoning, to be justified in believing that some proposition is true, or to 
provide reasons non-stop all the time. 
To my mind, the most interesting problem here is that Klein himself has said 
that the second clause of the PIJ would lead to the rejection of Infinitism: “[I]t is 
easy to see that if this condition [the second clause of the PIJ] were coupled with 
Infinitism, the consequence would be that any person having a justified belief 
must have a belief that gets ‘so complex’ that no human could ever have it”.
30 
Then, according to Klein, the acceptance of the second clause of the PIJ would 
lead to unbearably complex beliefs. 
This is interesting for many reasons. I suspect it reveals a blurry relationship 
between Infinitism and the metaepistemic requirement. While Klein bases the 
criticism against Foundationalism on the need for metaepistemic justification, he 
refuses to accept the second clause of the PIJ that just represents one way to pose 
the metaepistemic requirement. 
The criticism presented by Klein against Foundationalism does require metajus-
tification. When Klein asks the foundationalist, “why do you think that the basic 
proposition b is likely to be true?” and the foundationalist replies, “because b has 
some property f that makes b autonomously warranted,” Klein will insist on asking if 
this property f is a reason to think that b is likely to be true.
31 The absence of an 
answer for that last question entitles Klein to charge this type of Foundationalism 
with dogmatism. This means that Klein is requiring some metajustification: he is 
asking why the foundationalist thinks that this property f is adequate to make his 
belief b justified for him. Moreover, Klein seems to assume that it will be necessary 
to have this sort of metajustification in order to be justified in believing any proposi-
tion in the first place. If this is the case, then it highlights the fact that Infinitism 
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presupposes a metaepistemic requirement, or, in other words, that the absence of 
metajustification makes Foundationalism a theory that is impossible to uphold in a 
non-dogmatic way. 
This result is not surprising, since the criticism presented by Klein seems to be 
Pyrrhonian in essence. In fact, we could say that Klein is confronting Foundational-
ism with the Problem of the Criterion, because his criticism appears to be based on 
the impossibility of establishing a gap between first and second-order knowledge or 
justification. While the Pyrrhonians are committed to the view that it is impossible to 
know something without knowing that one knows, Klein is saying to the Founda-
tionalist that we cannot be rational without having a reason to believe that what 
justifies our beliefs really does justify them. 
The necessity of a metaepistemic requirement would be a very welcome desid-
eratum of Infinitism. However, Klein thinks that the second clause of the PIJ will 
lead to the rejection of Infinitism by generating unbearably complex beliefs. 
But the problem of overcomplexity may be just apparent, and could be resolved 
with the idea that what is necessary is the existence of an infinite number of ade-
quate reasons that may have different functions, such as reasons to believe p and 
reasons to believe that the reasons to believe p are adequate. This would not be a 
case of over-complexity, but only a case of availability of reasons with different func-
tions. 
Let us use an example to see both how complex our beliefs could become and if 
we really can have justification without metajustification. Suppose that someone 
believes that women are inferior to men on the basis of the belief that no woman 
has ever been president of the United States. What is claimed is that in order to have 
justification to believe that women are inferior to men, this person would have to 
have justification for believing that that reason, that no woman has ever been presi-
dent of the US, really justifies the belief that women are inferior to men. 
Let us look closely at this case. If S believes that women are inferior to men, S is 
supposed to have a reason, or reasons, to believe so. It is quite easy to imagine a 
disagreement about whether women are inferior to men. This situation creates a 
need to provide reasons, i.e. it inaugurates for S the process of justification of his 
belief that women are inferior to men. Then, S could say that he believes that 
women are inferior to men because no woman has ever been president of the US. 
This answer, as I think is clear, will not be enough to settle the matter. What, then, 
is S supposed to do after that? 
First of all, S is supposed to have a reason to believe that it is true that no 
woman has been president of the US. Let us grant that S does, in fact, have an 
appropriate reason to believe that no woman has ever been president of the US. 
Even so, that is obviously not enough to settle the question about women’s inferi-
ority. Having a reason to believe that no woman has ever been president of the US 
would at best (let us suppose) be considered necessary, but by no means suffi-
cient, for a justified belief that women are inferior to men. This is a very important 
point because it shows that the first clause of the PIJ is not enough to capture 
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is supposed to answer the following question: why do you think the reason “no 
woman has ever been president of the US” is in any way appropriate to justify the 
belief that women are inferior to men? Answering this question is decisive, given 
that a different reasoning could go: I believe that women are superior to men, and 
my reason to believe so is precisely that no woman has ever been president of the 
US. All that matters, again, is answering why S thinks that the reason “no woman 
has ever been president of the US” is appropriate to justify the belief that women 
are superior to men. 
The required metajustification can be achieved by one’s providing a reason 
about the epistemic effectiveness of “no woman has ever been president of the 
US” for justifying “women are inferior to men.” Now, why do we have to think that 
this reason will be unbearably complex? I don’t think it is, because all S needs is 
just another reason. This metareason (it will be a metareason if we are considering 
the belief that women are inferior to men) could be something like “the capacity of 
being a president determines gender superiority.” That would provide what the 
situation calls for. 
Of course, we don’t have to think that the regress will be stopped at this 
point. On the contrary, there is no reason to think that it will. If there is some 
doubt about the effectiveness of the metareason, S will have to provide more rea-
sons, if S has justification for believing that women are inferior to men. The next 
step would be to provide a reason why S thinks that being president determines 
gender superiority. But I can see no over-complexity here, since all we need in 
every step is just more simple reasons. What we have to understand is that the 
propositions that serve as reasons may have different functions. Then, we will still 
deal with individual reasons, reasons that play different roles, but not obviously 
complex enough as to become impossible for a person to grasp. 
As long as we are interested in pushing the process of justification further, we 
would find the same scenario with the same requirements. All we have to require is 
an infinite number of available reasons, and understand that those reasons may 
serve different functions: on the one hand, to justify, and, on the other, to serve as 
metajustification. The proposition that serves as metajustification for some belief will 
not be more complex than the proposition that serves as a reason to believe that 
proposition. 
This example, I hope, shows that we cannot separate epistemic levels. It 
shows that no one can be justified in believing that women are inferior to men if 
one doesn’t have metajustification – i.e. if one doesn’t have justification to believe 
that the fact that no woman has ever been president of the US adequately justifies 
the belief that women are inferior to men. If we don’t have justification to believe 
that our reasons are effective in justifying our beliefs, then we don’t have justifica-
tion at all. The opposite view give us an odd result: S is justified in believing that 
women are inferior to men, but S doesn’t need justification to believe that the 
reason that supports his belief is appropriate! The point is that justification must 
come along with metajustification, given that it is not possible to be justified in 
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We could think that Klein’s non-acceptance of the second clause of the PIJ 
has to do only with its content, and not with the idea of a metaepistemic re-
quirement in itself. I bet this is probably true. However, the rejection of the 
metaepistemic requirement is not only explained by the rejection of the second 
clause of the PIJ, but, maybe principally, by the very idea that it is not necessary 
to have justification that the reason r is objectively available to S in order for S to 
have justification to believe p on the basis of r. be that as it may, the point is not 
only that we may require a metaepistemic constraint, but that we must do so if 
we want to avoid the Bootstrapping Problem and if we want to use the sort of 
criticism Klein uses against Foundationalism. 
In conclusion, an Infinitist should accept the following: if S has justification 
to believe p, then S has metajustification to believe p, which means that if S has 
justification to believe p, then S has an infinite number of available reasons to 
believe p, and this “infinite number of available reasons” must include reasons 
with different functions, in particular, the reasons according to which S’s rea-
sons are effective – in other words, reasons according to which the reasons used 
by S are objectively available. 
This conclusion appears to be in accordance with something like the second 
clause of the PIJ – which will avoid the Bootstrapping Problem – as well as in 
accordance with the criticism presented by Klein against Foundationalism. 
In any case, I will not push this point further right now, because a defense 
of the inclusion of a specific metaepistemic requirement along with the other 
requirements of Infinitism will exceed the scope of this essay. The fundamental 
point is that Infinitism is capable of adopting the metaepistemic constraint, thus 
becoming a non-BKT view. This means that Infinitism is capable of avoiding the 
Bootstrapping Problem. 
Conclusion 
If Bootstrapping really is a problem, it is the result of having forgotten, or 
inverted, epistemic priority. The Bootstrapping Problem has been created by a 
theoretical intent that aims to provide solutions for a certain predicament, but 
fails to capture a fundamental aspect of the phenomenon of knowledge. Any 
resolution of the Bootstrapping Problem must reestablish the epistemic priority 
of second-order knowledge or justification. This can be achieved by imposing 
some constraints according to which we cannot know without properly knowing 
that we know. 
This metajustification, or metaknowledge, requirement may leave us to face 
one skeptical threat, the infinite regress of metajustification. I think in this case 
we only have two options: to think that Skepticism is the right position, since 
we cannot attain appropriate justification for believing or else to think that we 
can deal with higher-order regresses in pretty much the same way Infinitism 
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infinite in Infinitism, we will see a way to deal with both kinds of regresses. 
Infinitism seems to be the view that can best accommodate the metaepistemic 
requirement that is necessary to avoid the Bootstrapping Problem. However, 
that is not my conclusion for now. My conclusion here is that the only way to 
avoid the Bootstrapping Problem is adopting a metaepistemic requirement ac-
cording to which we cannot separate epistemic levels.
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